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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVEN D. CROWTHER, Trustee ] 
for COMPUTER SERVICE OF ] 
SOUTHERN UTAH PENSION TRUST, ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ; 
vs. 
MURLAN D. CARTER, 
Defendant-Appellant, ] 
i Case No. 870524-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this matter is 
by virtue of the "pour-over" authority of the Supreme Court of 
Utah and that Court's order in its case number 870350. This is 
an appeal from a judgment of the Fifth District Court of Iron 
County which dissolved a limited partnership and established 
certain redemption rights in behalf of the general partner. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err when it determined that the 
Limited Partnership Agreement between the parties was unambiguous 
as that Agreement defined "initial" and "additional" capital 
1 
contributions to be made by the limited partner? 
2. Did the trial court err in refusing to admit the 
proferred testimony of the Defendant-Appellant's "expert" 
accountant relating to the Defendant-Appellant's interpretation 
of the limited partnership agreement? 
3. Did the trial court err when it found that the Appellant 
had willfully breached the Limited Partnership Agreement? 
4. Did the trial court err when it granted the Plaintiff-
Appellant's request to order the dissolution of the partnership. 
5. Did the trial court err in setting the interest 
rate on the reacquisition cost at 1.5 percent over the State Bank 
of Southern Utah prime lending rate? 
6. Did the trial court err in setting aside the Trust 
Deed and Note executed by the Defendant and construing the 
dispute solely within the framework of the Partnership Agreement? 
7. Should this appeal be dismissed for failure to file 
a Supersedeas Bond? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
48-2-10, U.C.A., 1953, AS AMENDED. RIGHTS OF A 
LIMITED PARTNER-
(1) A limited partner shall have the same rights as a 
general partner to: 
(a) Have the partnership books kept at the 
principal place of business of the partnership, and at all times 
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to inspect and copy any of them; 
(b) Have on demand true and full information of 
all things affecting the partnership, and a formal account of 
partnership affairs whenever circumstances render it just and 
reasonable; and, 
(c) Have dissolution and winding up by decree of 
court. 
(2) A limited partner shall have the right to receive 
a share of the profits or other compensation by way of income, 
and to the return of his contribution as provided in sections 
48-2-15 and 48-2-16. 
48-2-13. U.C.A., 1953, AS AMENDED, LOANS AND OTHER 
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN PARTNERSHIP AND LIMITED PARTNER. 
(1) A limited partner also may lend money to, and 
transact other business with the partnership, and, unless he is 
also a general partner, receive on account of resulting claims 
against the partnership, with general creditors, a prorata share 
of the assets. If, at the time of receipt, the assets of the 
partnership are not sufficient to discharge partnership 
liabilities to persons not claiming as general or limited 
partners, no limited partner shall in respect to any such claim; 
(a) Receive as collateral security any 
partnership property or, 
(b) Receive from a general partner or the 
partnership any payment, conveyance, or release from liability. 
(2) Without prior written full disclosure to all 
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limited partners of the terms and the collateral involved in a 
proposed loan by a limited partner, no limited partner shall make 
a loan upon the security of the partnership property if, at the 
time such loan is made, the assets of the partnership are not 
sufficient to discharge partnership liabilities to persons not 
claiming as general or limited partners. 
(3) The making of a secured loan, or the receiving of 
collateral security, or a payment, conveyance or release in 
violation of the provisions of subsection (1) or (2) is a fraud 
on the creditors of the partnership. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff-Respondent has had possession of the 
assets of the partnership since June 1, 1985, under the ruling of 
the trial court at that time. Pursuant to the ruling of the 
trial court at that time and the later Decree of Dissolution and 
Judgment, the Plaintiff-Respondent has been operating the Mobile 
Home Park and R.V. Park and keeping the books and records 
thereof pending a final "winding up" of the partnerships 
affairs. There has yet to be the final Judgment of the trial 
court relating to the accounting of the "winding up" of the 
partnership affairs. This final Judgment is required to fix the 
reacquisition costs to the Defendant-Appellant should he attempt 
to exercise his rights to reacquire the property under the terms 
of the Partnership Agreement. 
4 
The Plaintiff-Respondent has always taken the position 
that he was entitled to full ownership of the major asset of the 
partnership, the Mobile Home Park and R.V. Park, under the terms 
of the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note which was executed on May 
23, 1983. The trial court, however, set aside the Trust Deed and 
Trust Deed Note and determined that the provisions of the Limited 
Partnership Agreement should govern the relationship between the 
general and limited partners and, after a series of hearings, 
entered the final Decree of Dissolution and Judgment on May 20, 
1987. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Limited Partnership Agreement is not ambiguous 
in making the distinction between initial capital contributions 
and additional capital contributions to be made by the 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
2. The trial court committed no error in refusing to 
permit opinion evidence from a certified public accountant. 
There was no foundation to support the receipt of expert evidence 
from the proferred witness. 
3. The Defendant-Appellant willfully breached the 
Partnership Agreement and the trial courtfs finding to that 
effect is well founded within the record. 
4. The trial courtfs determination that the 
partnership should be dissolved was founded not only upon the 
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acquisition of more than 100% of the partnership assets by the 
Plaintiff-Respondent, but was also founded upon the breach of the 
Partnership Agreement by the Defendant-Appellant. 
5. There was adequate support in the record for a 
determination that the interest rate on the reacquisition 
cost should be 1.5 percent over State Bank of Southern Utahfs 
prime lending rate. 
6. The trial court could have enforced, and this court 
should now enforce, the terms of the Trust Deed and Trust Deed 
Note in order to eliminate all accounting and "wind up" problems 
in this case. 
7. This appeal should be dismissed for the reason that 
the Defendant-Appellant has failed to file a supersedeas bond. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT IS NOT AMBIGUOUS IN 
MAKING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INITIAL CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND 
ADDITIONAL CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO BE MADE BY THE 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT. 
A reading of the Limited Partnership Agreement easily 
supports the finding of the trial court that the Agreement's 
terms were unambiguous. The pertinent paragraph 6 is quoted 
hereafter: 
6. CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE LIMITED 
PARTNER. The LIMITED PARTNER hereby agrees to 
make initial capital contributions to the 
PARTNERSHIP as follows: 
A. To pay off a certain 2nd Trust 
Deed presently of record against certain property 
located at 966-988 West 400 North, Cedar City, 
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Iron County, Utah, said property being a six (6) 
plex apartment building owned by the LIMITED 
PARTNER, the 2nd Trust Deed evidences a debt of 
approximately SEVENTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS 
$17,000.00 owed by the GENERAL PARTNER to the 
Stratton Brothers Cattle Company as a result of 
a previous law suit. 
B. To use his best efforts to 
substitute himself in place of the Country Aire 
Estates, a California Limited Partnership, on a 
1st Trust Deed Note between Country Aire Estates 
and First Security Bank in Cedar City, Iron 
County, Utah, which 1st Trust Deed Note covers 
the real property described under paragraph 5 
above. ' 
C. To use his best reasonable efforts 
to obtain a Letter of Credit or other bond or 
security as required by Cedar City Corporation 
to allow the development of the above-described 
property as a planned unit development in 
accordance with plans already preliminarily 
approved by Cedar City Corporation and to pay 
whatever expenses are attendent upon said bond, 
Letter of Credit, or other security. 
LIMITED PARTNER also agrees to contribute 
additional cash or property as capital for the 
use of the PARTNERSHIP for the following pur-
poses, should the GENERAL PARTNER request said 
contribution: 
A. Payment of the amount due on an 
unrecorded Real Estate Contract with a present 
balance of approximately NINETY FIVE THOUSAND 
FIVE HUNDRED ($95,500.00) which Contract covers 
the sale of the real property described in 
paragraph 5 hereof from Country Aire Estates, a 
California Limited Partnership, to MURLAN D. 
CARTER, the GENERAL PARTNER herein, which con-
tract bears payments of TWELVE HUNDRED AND NINE 
DOLLARS AND THIRTY EIGHT CENTS ($1,209.38) per 
month with the entire balance due in 1983. The 
payment of this Contract obligation will dis-
charge any purchase money obligation owing 
against the property described in paragraph 5 
hereinabove by paying off the unrecorded Real 
Estate Contract and the 1st Trust Deed Note 
described in paragraph 6 (B) above. 
B. Approximately SEVEN THOUSAND 
DOLXJAJIS ($7,000.00) back taxes due and payable 
to the County of Iron, State of Utah. 
C. Approximately FIFTEEN THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($15,000.00) claimed by Eckhoff, Watson, 
and Preator, Engineers of Cedar City, Utah, for 
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work allegedly done on the above-described real 
property and for which a Mechanicfs Lien has 
been filed and a law suit is in progress to 
foreclose the Lien and collect the amount due. 
D. Approximately FIVE THOUSAND 
($5,000.00) for the Cedar City Sewer Improvement 
District for sewer work in relation to the 
above-referenced property. 
E. Such other and further expenses 
as may arise during the development of the 
project. 
It is the intention of the GENERAL PARTNER 
and the LIMITED PARTNER to this Agreement, that 
in return for LIMITED PARTNER'S initial invest-
ment of SEVENTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($17,000.00) 
and his attempts to substitute himself in place 
of Country Aire Estates, a California Limited 
Partnership, on a 1st Trust Deed Note with First 
Security Bank, and his best effort to provide a 
Letter of Credit or other bond or security to 
finance the developments to the above-described 
real property; the LIMITED PARTNER shall have 
and hereby is given a twenty percent (20%) 
ownership interest in the real property and 
project described above. Further, in the event 
that LIMITED PARTNER is required to contribute 
any more cash to the development of the project, 
LIMITED PARTNER shall receive one (1) additional 
percentage point of ownership interest for each 
ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000.00) of additional 
cash which he contributes to the project. Frac-
tions of ONE THOUSAND DOLLAR ($1,000.00) contri-
butions will buy LIMITED PARTNER an equal 
fraction of ownership. 
It is further agreed between the parties 
that GENERAL PARTNER can reduce or eliminate 
LIMITED PARTNER'S ownership interest in the 
above-described real estate and project by 
paying to the LIMITED PARTNER, any time within 
five (5) years of the particular contribution 
by LIMITED PARTNER, all or part of the LIMITED 
PARTNER'S total contribution, which interest 
is to be calculated quarterly at one and one-
half percent (1 and 1/2%) above the prime 
interest rate. In the event that GENERAL 
PARTNER pays off the entire contribution plus 
interest as calculated above, then LIMITED 
PARTNER shall be eliminated from this project 
and shall have no further claim upon the 
project. In the event that GENERAL PARTNER 
pays only a portion of LIMITED PARTNER'S 
investment, then LIMITED PARTNER'S interest 
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shall be reduced one percent (1%) for every 
ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($1,000.00) of LIMITED 
PARTNERfs contribution repaid over and above 
LIMITED PARTNER'S initial contribution as set 
forth hereinabove in paragraph 6. Repayment 
of all or part of LIMITED PARTNER'S initial 
contribution shall be made in the same fashion 
as repayment of the LIMITED PARTNERfs additional 
contributions, that is ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($1,000.00) plus interest repaid to LIMITED 
PARTNER will reduce LIMITED PARTNERS ownership 
interest by 1 percent (1%). 
In the event that GENERAL PARTNER sells 
any portion of the above-described real estate 
in any fashion whatsoever within five' (5) years 
after any contribution by the LIMITED PARTNER 
as set forth hereinabove, and the GENERAL 
PARTNER does not within ninety six (96) hours 
after receiving the cash in hand apply those 
entire profits from said sale to paying off 
the LIMITED PARTNER'S investment herein, or 
applies only a portion of said profits to paying 
off the LIMITED PARTNER'S investment herein, 
then the amount of profits not so applied or 
any profits received after the five (5) year 
period will be divided between GENERAL PARTNER 
and LIMITED PARTNER in the same percentages as 
the percentage of ownership in said project held 
by GENERAL PARTNER and LIMITED PARTNER at a 
time 48 hours after GENERAL PARTNER receives 
said profits as cash in hand. 
The GENERAL PARTNER shall not encumber 
the property described in paragraph 5 herein-
above without the prior written consent of the 
LIMITED PARTNER. The GENERAL PARTNER shall 
notify the LIMITED PARTNER in writing five (5) 
days before the sale of the property described 
in paragraph 5 hereinabove of his intention to 
sell the property. If the LIMITED PARTNER 
disagrees with any term of the sale or with 
the sale itself, he must within five (5) days 
after receiving notice of the GENERAL PARTNER'S 
intent to sell, file with the GENERAL PARTNER 
his objection in writing to the sale. In the 
event that the GENERAL PARTNER and the LIMITED 
PARTNER cannot agree on the arrangements for 
the sale of any portion of the real property 
described in paragraph 5 hereinabove, both 
parties hereby agree that the dispute shall 
be submitted to J. Philip Eves, Attorney at 
Law, 110 North Main Street, Suite H., Cedar 
City, Utah 84720, to act as arbitrator, or 
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such other person as J. Philip Eves shall 
appoint. In the event that J. Philip Eves 
fails or refuses to act as arbitrator or to 
appoint someone else to act in the capacity, 
the PARTNERS shall select another person upon 
whom they can both agree to act in that capa-
city. The decision of the arbitrator shall 
be binding on both parties. 
The above-quoted portion of the Limited Partnership 
Agreement is clearly delineated into two categories of 
contributions to the partnership. First there is the initial 
i 
capital contribution payment of approximately $17,000.00 on the 
six plex apartment building, then to use his best efforts to 
substitute himself in the place of Country Aire Estates on a 
1st Trust Deed Note with First Security Bank, and finally to use 
his best efforts to obtain a Letter of Credit or bond required by 
Cedar City Corporation for development of the Mobile Home Park 
property. The Limited Partner then would obtain additional 
interest in the limited partnership by paying, in 1983, the 
entire balance of the Trust Deed Note with First Security Bank, 
plus back taxes, plus a $15,00.00 Mechanic's Lien, plus $5,000.00 
to Cedar City Corporation and other development costs. The 
initial contributions entitled the Plaintiff-Respondent to twenty 
percent (20%) of the partnership. The additional contributions 
gave the Plaintiff-Respondent one percent (1%) per $1,000.00 of 
contribution giving the Plaintiff-Respondent more than one 
hundred percent (100%) of the ownership of the agreement. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN REFUSING TO 
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PERMIT OPINION EVIDENCE FROM A CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT. THERE 
WAS NO FOUNDATION TO SUPPORT THE RECEIPT OF EXPERT EVIDENCE FROM 
THE PROFERRED WITNESS. 
While the Defendant-Appellant has failed to cite to the 
recprd the proffered testimony, the Plaintiff-Respondent believes 
that the proferred testimony of Mr. Claude Slack of Cedar City 
(T. 144-147) is the area of concern. The proferred testimony 
was: 
Mr. Burns: We intend to prove, your Honor, 
that under the terms of the Limited Partnership 
and general usage of that accounting, that it 
would be wholly and totally unreasonable for 
anyone to ever have 122 percent of the limited 
partnership, but it would be most reasonable to 
have 20 percent of a limited partnership given 
the contributions of Mr. Crowther, under general 
accounting principles. 
The trial court found that the proferred testimony 
would "be a conclusion that would be invading the province of the 
trier of fact.11 (T. 146) No further proffer exists within the 
record establishing the expertise of the proposed witness other 
than his receipt of a bachelor fs degree in accounting and the 
fact that he was a certified public accountant. 
There is insufficient proffer or other evidence within 
the record to establish the expertise of the witness, his degree 
of familiarity with the necessary facts, and the logical nexus 
between his opinion and the facts adduced. (Edwards 
v.Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 [Utah 1979]) 
Even if the exclusion of this testimony by the trial 
court was error, the interpretation of the contract towards which 
the testimony was directed would make such error harmless. 
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Ill 
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WILLFULLY BREACHED THE 
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT AND THE TRIAL COURT fS FINDING TO THAT 
EFFECT IS WELL FOUNDED WITHIN THE RECORD, 
The trial court was well within its perogatives when it 
determined that the Defendant-Appellant had willfully breached 
the Partnership Agreement. The Defendant-Appellant had used 
partnership funds to put tires on a vehicle not owned by the 
partnership and used by the Defendant-Appellant for his own 
personal use. The Defendant-Appellant had paid his wife a salary 
from partnership funds, when he himself was prohibited from 
taking such a salary, and no notice was ever given to the 
Plaintiff-Respondent of this process. Defendant-Appellant had 
paid for his own real estate license from partnership funds. The 
Defendant-Appellant never deeded the partnership property to the 
partnership but kept it in his own name. 
A review of the entire record and the accounting of the 
Defendant-Appellant shows that he did not comply with the 
requirements of the Partnership Agreement. 
IV 
THE TRIAL COURT fS DETERMINATION THAT THE PARTNERSHIP 
SHOULD BE DISSOLVED WAS FOUNDED NOT ONLY UPON THE ACQUISITION OF 
MORE THAN 100 PERCENT OF THE PARTNERSHIP ASSETS BY THE 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, BUT WAS ALSO FOUNDED UPON THE BREACH OF THE 
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT BY THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 
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The statement of the trial court at page 200 of the 
trial transcript gives the Courtfs reasoning very clearly: 
The significance of that is that if I find 
that the partnership still exists, it is in a 
sense no longer a partnership because the 
plaintiff would own 125 percent of it. The 
defendant, and this wouldn't necessarily 
dissolve — well, it would dissolve the partner-
ship, but there would be contractual rights 
that would — residual rights in the nature 
of rights to redeem, which the defendant 
would still own, which would differ somewhat 
from rights to redeem under the trust deed 
foreclosure and there may be some other signif-
icant things that I haven't thought through. 
The courtfs reasoning for this determination is by a 
clear reading of the Partnership Agreement. The dissolution of 
the partnership is supported by the Plaintiff-Respondent1s total 
ownership of the assets of the partnership and the actions of the 
Defendant-Appellant as a predator upon those assets. The total 
ownership of the assets is dealt with in the reading of the 
Partnership Agreement as set forth in Argument I above. The 
record well supports and the court reasonably found that the 
Plaintiff-Respondent was entitled to 20 percent of the 
partnership assets upon his initial contributions, and upon the 
discharge of the $95,000.00 1st Deed of Trust at First Security 
Bank acquired over 100 percent of the partnership. The court 
construed the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed executed on May 23, 
1983, as additional security for the Partnership Agreement, 
rather than a transaction superceding the Partnership Agreement. 
At that point, the Limited Partner had the total ownership of the 
partnership interest and certainly had the right to request that 
the court order the partnership dissolved, which the court did. 
(48-2-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended) 
The court also was well founded in determining that the 
General Partner had breached the Partnership Agreement by the 
manner in which the General Partner dealt with the books and 
records of the partnership and with partnership funds. The court 
heard testimony and saw other evidence that the 
Defendant-Appellant had paid a managerial salary to his wife out 
of partnership profits (T. 72), had purchased tires for a vehicle 
when the partnership did not own a vehicle (T. 69-70) , and 
purchased his own real estate license (T. 73) . All of these 
items have been accounted for in the general ledger of the 
partnership which was admitted into evidence as Exhibit P-13. On 
these grounds the court was well supported granting the 
Plaintiff-Respondent's request to dissolve the partnership. 
V 
THERE WAS ADEQUATE SUPPORT IN THE RECORD FOR A 
DETERMINATION THAT THE INTEREST RATE ON THE REACQUISITION COST 
SHOULD BE 1.5 PERCENT OVER STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH'S PRIME 
LENDING RATE. 
The court adopted the proposed Findings of Fact 
submitted by the Plaintiff-Respondent as is indicated at page 278 
of the record. The Plaintiff-Respondent had submitted proposed 
Findings that tied the interest rate for reacquisition costs to 
the prime lending rate of State Bank of Southern Utah, a bank 
located in Cedar City, the residence of both Plaintiff-Respondent 
and Defendant-Appellant. The proposed language of the 
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Defendant-Appellant used "New York prime lending rate" which is 
an indefinite and unusable standard. The minute entry of June 
11, 1985, (R. 206) fixes the interest at 1 and 1/2 percent 
over prime rate. This reflects the same language referred to in 
paragraph 6 of the Partnership Agreement as quoted above in this 
brief. The undersigned recalls that at the time of the June 11, 
1985, hearing, the Defendant-Appellant agreed to use State Bank 
of Southern Utah as the institution upon which to base the prime 
rate figure. However, there is no transcript of that hearing in 
the record so it must be presumed that the court's finding is 
correct. 
VI 
THE TRIAL COURT COULD HAVE ENFORCED, AND THIS COURT 
SHOULD NOW ENFORCE, THE TERMS OF THE TRUST DEED AND TRUST DEED 
NOTE IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE ALL ACCOUNTING AND "WIND UP" PROBLEMS 
IN THIS CASE. 
The Complaint in this case originally sought the 
foreclosure as a mortgage of the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note 
executed by the Defendant-Appellant on May 23, 1983. If a 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure were granted by this Court, 
the Plaintiff-Respondent would assume all of the ownership 
interests in the Mobile Home Park and R.V. Park as his sole 
remedy. There would be no issue of the "wind up" of partnership 
affairs or any claim for accounting after May 23, 1983, in this 
action. This remedy is clearly contemplated by the legislature 
in the statutory provision of 48-2-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
15 
as amended. This position was argued to the trial 
court. (T. 193) 
VII 
THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR THE REASON THAT THE 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO FILE A SUPERSEDEAS BOND. 
Rule 8 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
provides for a stay of the Judgment of a Distript Court only upon 
a Motion to the District Court from which the appeal is taken. 
No such Motion has been made in this case, nor has any 
appropriate bond been filed as is contemplated by Rule 8. 
Without a stay order and the filing of the bond, which would be 
demanded by Plaint iff-Respondent, the property which is the sole 
asset of the partnership, will be sold at a Sheriff's Sale on May 
23, 1988. The likelihood of this appeal reaching a resolution by 
that date is slight. The Defendant-Appellant has taken no action 
to forestall the Sheriff's Sale and such a sale would render all 
issues in this appeal moot. Because of this failure on the part 
of the Defendant-Appellant, his appeal should be dismissed 
forthwith. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff-Respondent respectfully requests this 
Court to dismiss the appeal forthwith. Should the Court decline 
such a dismissal, the Plaintiff-Respondent requests that the 
Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note be foreclosed as a Note and 
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Mortgage immediately. Alternately, the Plaintiff-Respondent 
requests that the Decree of Dissolution and Judgment be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of December, 1987. 
J^ &tfS L. SHUMATE 
ttorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
110 North Main, Suite H 
P.O. Box 623 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-3772 
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of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to G. Michael 
Westfall, Gallian & Westfall, Dixie State Bank Building, One 
South Main Street, P.O. Box 367, St. George, Utah 84770, this 
12th day of December, 1987, first class postage prepaid. 
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